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Overlooked Danger:
The Security and Rights Implications of
Hindu Nationalism in India
Smita Narula*
INTRODUCTION
As a region, South Asia has gained significant prominence in the eyes of
the international community as a focal point for the U.S.-led war against
terrorism. So-called Islamic fundamentalism in South Asia and the Middle
East is the subject of much debate and analysis and the justification for ra-
cially and religiously charged immigration and detention policies in the
West. Much overlooked is the dramatic rise of Hindu nationalism in India
and the dangerous and even violent policies espoused by the ruling Bha-
ratiya Janata Party ("BJP") and its sister organizations-policies that have
already resulted in considerable violence against India's Muslim, Christian,
and Dalit, or "untouchable," minorities.
While madrassas, or Islamic schools, have come under scrutiny for their
recruitment and training of future jihadis in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
more recently Bangladesh, the mushrooming of hundreds of thousands of
shakhas, or Hindu training camps in India, has been dangerously overlooked.
India's shift away from secular democracy and toward the militarization of a
growing Hindu nationalist cadre poses a significant threat to the human
rights of India's lower castes and religious minorities and, in a region with
two long-term and now nuclear foes, to the security of the region as a whole.
If the activities of these groups remain unchecked, violence may spread to
other parts of the country. When compounded with the growing political
influence of the Islamic right and the military in Pakistan and Bangladesh,
Hindu militarization may destabilize the region as a whole.
This Article will examine the rise of Hindu nationalism in India and pro-
vide an overview of its already devastating consequences. In February and
March 2002, over 2000 people were killed in state-supported violence
against Muslims in the western state of Gujarat, led by the Hindu national-
* Senior Researcher for South Asia, Human Rights Watch; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1997; B.A.,
M.A., Brown University, 1994. This Article is based on numerous investigations by the author in India
for Human Rights Watch between January 1998 and January 2003.
Harvard Human RightsJournal / Vol. 16
ist BJP that also heads a coalition government at the center. The attacks
were carried out with impunity by members of the BJP, the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh ("RSS," National Volunteer Corps), the Vishwa Hindu
Parishad ("VHP," World Hindu Council), and the Bajrang Dal (the militant
youth wing of the VHP). Collectively, these groups are known as the sangh
parivar, or family of Hindu nationalist organizations. Police and state
officials were directly implicated in many of the attacks. The BJP is the po-
litical wing of the sangh parivar.'
Violence and other abuses against marginalized groups in India are part of
a concerted campaign of these and related orgafiizations-whose leadership
is dominated by upper-caste Hindus-to promote and exploit communal
tensions in order to retain political and economic power. Nationwide vio-
lence against India's Muslim community in 1992 and 1993 and against In-
dia's Christian community since 1998, including in the state of Gujarat, has
also stemmed from the violent activities and hate propaganda of these
groups. Human rights groups have long warned of the destructive potential
of the sangh parivar's agenda-an agenda that exerts considerable influence
over the nation's educational, social, defense, and anti-terrorism policies.
The Indian government continues to exploit rhetoric surrounding the global
war on terror to silence political dissent while the sangh parivar invokes the
threat of Islamic terrorism in the aftermath of September 11 to justify the
persecution of Muslims. Operating under the guise of patriotism, the pro-
ponents of Hindu nationalism are achieving mainstream credibility. This
Article also discusses the "communalization" of education by the Hindu
right: a battle to shape the minds of today's youth and tomorrow's leaders.
The promotion of Hindu nationalism as a legitimate political and cultural
force has consequences beyond its impact on the lives of India's lower castes
and religious minorities. Attacks on Muslims in India have their corre-
sponding effect on Hindus in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Similarly, atrocities
against Hindus in Bangladesh and Pakistan-supported militancy in Kashmir
are often cited as justifications for the persecution of Muslims in India. As
the religious right gains significant footholds in electoral politics in Bangla-
desh and Pakistan, attacks on religious minorities in those countries have
also reached alarming proportions.
I: HINDU NATIONALISM'S HISTORY AND TACTICS
A. The Rise of Hindu Nationalism in India and Abroad
The RSS was founded in the city of Nagpur in 1925 by Keshav. Baliram
Hedgewar with the mission of creating a Hindu state. Since its founding, it
has promulgated a militant form of Hindu nationalism as the sole basis for
1. The BJP is not the only political party complicit in large-scale episodes of communal violence in
India. In 1984, following the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards, the
then-ruling Congress (I) Party was charged with complicity in the killing of over 2000 Sikhs in Delhi.
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national identity in India. According to the RSS, both the leaders of India's
nationalist movement and those of post-independence India failed to create a
nation based on Hindu culture: 2
While efforts to hasten political independence were being pursued
in various forms, there were few or no sustained efforts for restora-
tion of the Hindu psyche to its pristine form. Indeed, it is the lat-
ter which should constitute the content or core of freedom. Such
was the backdrop for envisioning a country wide movement such
as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. 3
The ideology of Hindutva, or a movement for Hindu awakening, is a politi-
cal strategy rooted in the teachings of the founders of the RSS. To be clear,
Hindutva is not Hinduism, nor can its proponents legitimately claim adher-
ence to Hinduism's principles of nonviolence and tolerance. To the contrary,
the RSS ideologue, M. S. Golwalkar, based much of his teachings on the race
theories of Nazi Germany. A now infamous passage from his book We, or Our
Nationhood Defined, published in 1939, states:
German national pride has now become the topic of the day. To
keep up the purity of the nation and its culture, Germany shocked
the world by her purging the country of the semitic races-the
Jews. National pride at its highest has been manifested here. Ger-
many has also shown how well-nigh impossible it is for races and
cultures, having differences going to the [root], to be assimilated
2. Tapio Tamminen, Hindu Revivalism and the Hindutva Movement, 32 TEMENOS 221-238 (1996), at
http://www.abo.fi/comprel/temenos/temeno32/tamminen.htm. The RSS did not play an active role in the
nationalist struggle for independence, as it had several ideological differences with the Indian National
Congress. While the nationalist struggle centered on ending British rule, the RSS believed that restoring
Hinduism should be the cornerstone of the movement. The RSS was particularly critical of what it
termed the Congress' policy of "appeasement of Muslims" and was vehemently opposed to the partition
of India and the creation of Pakistan. In the aftermath of Mahatma Gandhi's assassination by Nathuram
Godse, a Hindu nationalist and allegedly a former RSS member who shared its views, the RSS was
officially banned in India. Following its ban, and partly to remove the stigma of being a paramilitary
outfit, the RSS became more active in the political and social welfare arena. The Indian government
recognized its community service contributions and allowed the RSS to participate in the Republic Day
parade in 1963. Between 1975 and 1977 the RSS was banned again, along with many other organiza-
tions, when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency. Apart from this two-year pe-
riod, the RSS and its sister organizations have been in the mainstream of Indian politics since the 1960s.
Id. See generally CHRISTOPHE JAFFRELOT, THE HINDU NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND INDIAN POLITICS:
1925 TO THE 1990s (C. Hurst & Co. trans., Penguin Books India 1999) (1993).
3. RASHTRIYA SWAYAMSEVAK SANGH, Antidote to Self-Oblivion, in WIDENING HORIZONS, at
http://www.rss.org/books/WideningHorizons/ch3.html. The official Web site of the RSS states the fol-
lowing as its mission, reproduced in part:
The R.S.S. stands for the spread of Hindu culture .... The mission of the R.S.S. is to unite
and rejuvenate our nation on the sound foundation of Dharma. This mission can be achieved
by a strong and united Hindu society. Therefore the R.S.S. has undertaken the task of uniting
the Hindus. Rejuvenation of the Hindu nation is in the interest of the whole humanity.
http://www.rss.org/mission.htm.
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into one united whole, a good lesson for us in Hindustan to learn
and profit by.'
More than fifty-five years after independence, the RSS still sees itself as
the antidote to what it considers the dangerous tendencies of modern-day
India:
The erosion of the nation's integrity in the name of secularism,
economic and moral bankruptcy, incessant conversions from the
Hindu fold through money-power, ever-increasing trends of seces-
sion, thought patterns and education dissonant with the native
character of the people, and State-sponsored denigration of any-
thing that goes by the name of Hindu or Hindutwa.5
The RSS wanted "the entire gamut of social life" to be designed "on the
rock-bed of Hindu nationalism," 6 a goal that inspired the creation of the
RSS political, social, and educational wings, a family of organizations that is
now referred to collectively as the sangh parivar.7 What began as a fringe
movement has become a formidable force whose members are well repre-
sented in the wide spectrum of Indian political, social, and cultural life,
both within the country and among Indians abroad.
The BJP is the political wing of the sangh parivar.8 It heads a coalition
government at the national level and, in January 2003, controlled the state
legislatures of Gujarat, Goa, Himachal Pradesh, and was part of the ruling
coalition of the government of Uttar Pradesh. Many of the activities of
sangh groups have aimed to consolidate a Hindu vote bank to support the
BJP's bid for political power at the state and federal level.
The Vishwa Hindu Parishad was formed in 1964 to cover the social as-
pects of the RSS activities.9 The VHP organizes and communicates the RSS
message to Hindus living outside India and holds conferences for Hindu
4. Marzai Casolari, Hindutva's Foreign Tie-Up in the 1930s: Archival Evidence, ECON. & POL. WKLY.,
218, 224 (2002), at http://www.ercwilcom.net/%7Eindowindow/sad/godown/secular/fascirss.htm. While
current sangh parivar leaders have distanced themselves somewhat from Golwalkar's teachings in order to
maintain broad-based legitimacy, the so-called virtues of fascism and Nazism continue to be extolled in
some Indian textbooks. A 1999 article in the periodical Communalism Combat, for example, reported that
tenth grade textbooks in Gujarat contained sections on the "Ideology of Fascism" and the "Ideology of
Nazism." The sections detail strong national pride associated with both ideologies, efficiency in bureauc-
racy, and other "achievements," but ignore the horrific brutality meted out by the regimes, including the
Holocaust. Sabrang Communications and Publishing Pvt. Ltd., On Fascism and Nazism, COMMUNALISM
COMBAT, Oct. 1999, at 18, available at http://www.sabrang.com/cc/comold/oct99/cover2.htm.
5. RASHTrRIYA SWAYAMSEVAK SANGH, Sangh: A Dynamic Powerhouse, in WIDENING HOIZONS, at
http://www.rss.org/books/wideninghorizons/ch2.html.
6. RASHTRIYA SWAYAMSEVAK SANGH, Sangh-Inspired Organisations, in WIDENING HORIZONS, at
http://www.rss.org/books/WideningHorizons/ch7.html.
7. Id.
8. The Jana Sangh Party was formed in 1951 as the political wing of the RSS. It was replaced by the
Bharatiya Janata Party in 1980.
9. See http://www.vhp.org/englishsite/a-origin-growth/whyvhp.htm.
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religious leaders from across the country. It is actively involved in Sanskrit
education, the organization of Hindu rites and rituals, and converting Chris-
tians, Muslims and tribals (animists) to Hinduism.10
The Bajrang Dal is the militant youth wing of the VHP. It was formed in
1984, during the Babri Masjid conflict,1" in order to mobilize youth for the
Ram temple campaign.' 2 A young women's association, the Durga Vahini,
was also founded at this time. 13 With its loose organizational structure, the
Bajrang Dal initially operated under different names in different states. Ba-
jrang Dal activists have been involved in many acts of violence carried out
by Hindutva organizations, including the spate of attacks against the Chris-
tian community in India since 1998 and the communal violence in Gujarat
in 2002.14
The Vidya Bharati (or the Vidya Bharati Akhil Bharatiya Siksha Sansthan)
was established in 1978 with the objective of organizing the RSS activities
in education. Similar organizations at the state and regional levels have ex-
isted since the 1940s. The Vidya Bharati reportedly runs over 20,000
schools in India, serving 2.4 million children, many with recognition and
funding from the state. Over 1000 schools have been added each year in the
last decade. 15
The sangh parivar has successfully expanded its operations overseas, in-
viting influential and affluent Indian expatriate communities into its fold.
The RSS Web site proudly boasts that "similar work is going on in over 100
countries where volunteers are busy organizing Hindus under different or-
ganizations." 16 In addition to forming an ideological bridge across conti-
nents, sangh-affiliated organizations in countries such as the United States
also provide financial support for RSS activities in India. A November 2002
report, The Foreign Exchange of Hate: IDRF and the American Funding of Hin-
dutva, documents the financial ties between the Indian Development and
Relief Fund ("IDRF"), a U.S.-based charity, and Hindu nationalist groups in
India that have been linked to attacks against Muslims and Christians,
forcible conversions of tribals to Hinduism, and other atrocities. 17 The study
found that
10. See http://www.vhp.org/englishsite/b-objectives/aim-object.htm.
11. See infra text accompanying note 22.
12. N. K. Singh and U. Mahurkar, Bajrang Dal: Loonies at Large, INDIA TODAY, Feb. 8, 1999.
13. For more on women's activism within the Hindu right, see WOMEN AND THE HINDU RIGHT: A
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS (Tanika Sarkar & Urvashi Butalia eds., 1995).
14. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: ATTACKS AGAINST CHRIS-
TIANS IN INDIA (1999) [hereinafter ATTACKS AGAINST CHRISTIANS]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "WE
HAVE No ORDERS TO SAVE YOU": STATE PARTICIPATION AND COMPLICITY IN COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN
GUJARAT (2002) [hereinafter No ORDERS TO SAVE YOU].
15. Somini Sengupta, Hindu Nationalists are Enrolling and Enlisting India's Poor, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
2002; Interviews with Vidya Bharati officials, in Uttar Pradesh, Goa, and Gujarat (Dec. 2002-Jan.
2003).
16. http://www.rss.org/rssho.htm.
17. SABRANG COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLISHING PVT. LTD. & THE SOUTH ASIA CITIZENS WEB,
THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE OF HATE: IDRF AND THE AMERICAN FUNDING O1 HINDUTVA (2002), at
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less than 20 percent of the funds sent to India by IDRF go to or-
ganizations that are not openly non-sectarian and/or affiliated with
the Sangh. More than 50 percent of the funds disbursed by the
IDRF are sent to Sangh related organizations whose primary work
is religious 'conversion' and 'Hinduization' in poor and remote
tribal and rural areas of India. Another sixth is given to Hindu re-
ligious organizations for purely religious use. Only about a fifth of
the funds go for disaster relief and welfare-most of it because the
donors specifically designated it so. However, there is considerable
documentation indicating that even the relief and welfare organi-
zations that IDRF funds, use the moneys in a sectarian way. In
summary, in excess of 80 percent of IDRF's funding is allocated for
work that is clearly sectarian in nature.'
IDRF has rejected the allegations contained in the report and has asserted
that it "does not subscribe to any religious, political, or sectarian agendas."' 9
Many who donate to IDRF and other such groups do so for charitable and
humanitarian purposes and are arguably unaware of some of the uses of their
funding.
An increasingly influential Indian lobby in the United States has also
thwarted attempts by the U.S. Congress to raise concerns over human rights
violations in India. The Indian American community effectively blocked, for
example, a congressional resolution expressing concern about the violence
against Muslims in Gujarat. According to an article in the Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review,
As word of the pending resolution spread, Indian-American groups
inundated Senate offices with e-mails and phone calls opposing the
resolution. 'We did not move on this because we were buried' [by
messages], says a congressional aide. Senators had hoped to pass the
resolution ahead of Secretary of State Colin Powell's visit to India
in late July [20021.20
B. Communal Violence as a Political Strategy
As Hindu nationalism gains legitimacy abroad, recent electoral wins by
the BJP have emboldened its sangh parivar affiliates to continue to pursue
their communally divisive strategies at home. In December 2002, the BJP
won a decisive victory in state-assembly elections in Gujarat, handing the
political party its only conclusive win in recent years. Employing a hardline
http:// www.mnet.fr/aiindex/2002/FEH/.
18. Id at § t.4.
19. Press Release, India Development and Relief Fund, IDRF Dismisses Hate Campaign Against
IDRF Launched by Leftist Groups (Nov. 22, 2002), at http://www.idrf.org/pressreleasel 12202.html.
20. Indian-Americans Stall Resolution, FAR E. ECON. REv., Aug. 8, 2002.
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Hindutva platform, the BJP gained the most seats in areas that were affected
by communal violence in February and March 2002, and'in which members
of the BJP were implicated. The elections were considered critical to the
political future of the party that had suffered a series of election losses in key
states.
Soon after the Gujarat win, VHP International General Secretary Praveen
Togadia asserted that the experiment of the "Hindutva lab" would be re-
peated elsewhere in the country, raising concerns that violence would again
be deployed as a political strategy. Togadia went on to state that "[a] Hindu
Rashtra [state] can be expected in the next two years .... We will change
India's history and Pakistan's geography by then."'" Nine states were set to
go to the polls in 2003, followed by national elections in 2004 in which the
BJP hopes to gain enough seats to rule outside the constraints of a coalition
government.
While Gujarat could be the harbinger of things to come, it is also the end
result of years of grassroots rabble-rousing by the sangh parivar. The center-
piece of its strategy is a campaign to build a temple to the Hindu God Ram
at the site of the destroyed sixteenth-century Babri Masjid (mosque) in the
city of Ayodhya in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. The temple cam-
paign, the RamJanmabhoomi movement, is led by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad.
The VHP claims that the site of the mosque was actually the birthplace of
Ram and that a temple at that site had been destroyed in order to build the
mosque.2 2
On December 6, 1992, the mosque was destroyed. In the months pre-
ceding the demolition, the BJP, the RSS, the VHP, and the Shiv Sena 23 had
called for the construction of a temple on the site of the mosque as integral
to their struggle to achieve Hindu rule in India. Over 150,000 supporters
converged on Ayodhya, and, using hammers and pick-axes, reduced the
mosque to rubble. The police did not intervene. The incident sparked vio-
lence across the country in which at least 1700 people were killed, thou-
sands were injured, and an unknown number of women and girls were
raped. The majority of the victims were Muslim. The focal point of the vio-
lence was the city of Bombay, the capital of Maharashtra state. For the ten
days following December 6, much of the violence took place between the
police and Muslims protesting the destruction of the mosque. Police fired on
demonstrators, entered and burned Muslim homes, and fired on their resi-
dents. Hindus marching in support of the destruction of the mosque were
21. Rediff.com, 'Hindu Rashira' in Two Years: Togadia, (Dec. 15, 2002), at http://www.rediff.com/
election/2002/dec/15guj 13.htm.
22. See http://www.vhp.org/englishsite/e.Special-Movements/dRanjanambhumi%20Muti/
historyoframjanambhoomi. htm.
23. The Shiv Sena is a Hindu party based in the state of Maharashtra. See http://www.shivsena.org/
profile.htm.
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left alone. In the latter days of the violence, members of the Shiv Sena at-
tacked Muslim households alongside the police.2 4
The Srikrishna Commission was established in response to the violence in
Bombay. The Commission's report, presented to the government of Ma-
harashtra in February 1998, more than five years after the violence took
place, determined that the attacks were the result of a deliberate and sys-
tematic effort to incite violence against Muslims. It singled out Shiv Sena
leader Bal Thackeray and Chief Minister Manohar Joshi as responsible. The
Shiv Sena-BJP-led government refused to adopt the Commission's recom-
mendations, and instead labeled the report "anti-Hindu."2 5
The campaign to build the Ram temple is ongoing and continues to raise
the specter of further violence in the country. The recent revival of the cam-
paign in 2002, corresponding to BJP election losses in key states, centered
on the March 15, 2002 deadline set by the VHP to bring stone pillars to the
site in order to initiate the temple's construction.26 In the weeks preceding
the violence in Gujarat, Hindu activists had been traveling to and from
Ayodhya on the Sabarmati Express train. On February 27, 2002, following
weeks of rising tensions between Hindu activists and Muslim vendors at the
train station, a Muslim mob attacked Hindu activists riding in a train car of
the Sabarmati Express. Two train cars were set on fire, killing at least fifty-
eight people, including women and children.
Between February 28 and March 2, 2002, a three-day retaliatory killing
spree by Hindus left hundreds of Muslims dead and tens of thousands
homeless and dispossessed throughout Gujarat, marking the country's worst
religious bloodletting since the Bombay riots a decade earlier. The looting
and burning of Muslim homes, shops, restaurants, and places of worship was
also widespread. Tragically consistent with a longstanding pattern of attacks
on minorities, tribals, and Dalits in India, and with previous episodes of
large-scale communal violence, scores of Muslim girls and women were bru-
tally raped before being mutilated and burnt to death.
Numerous Indian and international human rights organizations, as well
as the Indian media, reported that the attacks were planned well in advance
of the Godhra incident, with extensive support from state officials. A report
released by Human Rights Watch in April 2002 stated that the Hindu
mobs were
guided by computer printouts listing the addresses of Muslim
families and their properties, information obtained from the Ah-
medabad municipal corporation among other sources, and em-
24. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, INDIA: COMMUNAL VIOLENCE AND THE DENIAL OF JUS-
TICE (1996), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/India1.htm.
25. Thackeray Slammed by Report, Saved by CM, INDIAN EXPRESS, Aug. 7, 1998.
26. India's Supreme Court Bans Religious Ceremony in Ayodhya, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 13, 2002.
A Supreme Court order issued two days before the March 15 deadline halted the planned construction.
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barked on a murderous rampage confident that the police was with
them. In many cases, the police led the charge, using gunfire to
kill Muslims who got in the mobs' way. A key BJP state minister
is reported to have taken over police control rooms in Ahmedabad
on the first day of the carnage, issuing orders to disregard pleas for
assistance from Muslims. Portions of the Gujarati language press
meanwhile printed fabricated stories and statements openly calling
on Hindus to avenge the Godhra attacks.2"
The police and various state officials were implicated in many of the at-
tacks, in some cases as passive observers and in others as participants in the
burning and looting of shops and homes and the killing of Muslims. In
many cases the police came ahead of the mobs, aiming and firing at Muslim
youth that got in the way.28
In July 2002, results of an official investigation by the Ahmedabad-based
Forensic Science Laboratory stated that the fire on the Sabarmati Express in
Godhra could not have been set by the mob from the outside as had been
alleged; the fire, it claimed, was set from inside the train. 29 Allegations have
also emerged that the Godhra victims may not have all been Hindu activists,
whose deaths were allegedly avenged in the retaliatory killing of Muslims.
Railway authorities have also consistently refused to publish the list of pas-
senger names. 30 These and other reports have cast a shadow on the events of
February 27. Investigations into the attack were ongoing at this writing.
In the aftermath of the violence, Muslim victims have been denied equal
protection of the law and equal treatment in the disbursement of relief and
rehabilitation services. An estimated 100,000 people, a majority of them
Muslim, were internally displaced in the state following the massacres. For
months they lived in makeshift relief camps throughout Gujarat. The state
failed to provide them with adequate security or relief. The burden of pro-
viding much needed food and medical supplies rested largely with Muslim
charities and nongovernmental organizations. 31 By October 2002, most of
the camps had been closed, forcing Muslims to return to what was left of
their homes or seek shelter elsewhere, fearing ongoing violence at home. 32
Perpetrators continue to enjoy ongoing impunity for the attacks. The
Human Rights Watch report adds:
27. No ORDERS TO SAVE YOU, supra note 14, at 5.
28. Id. at 21-27. See also Sabrang Communications and Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Police: Criminals in Uni-
form, COMMUNALISM COMBAT, (Mar.-Apr. 2002), at http://www.sabrang.com/cc/archive/2002/marapril/
police.htm; Citizens for Justice and Peace, Police: Dereliction of Duty, CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY (Vol. 1),
at http://www.sabrang.com/tribunal/volI/annex/annex9.html.
29. Godhra Bogie Burnt from Inside, says report, TIMES OF INDIA, July 4, 2002.
30. Rajesh Ramachandran, Godhra Victims May Not Have Been Kar Sevaks, TIMES OF INDIA, Aug. 6,
2002.
31. No ORDERS TO SAVE YOU, supra note 14, at 57-58.
32. Investigations by the author, in Gujarat (Jan. 2003).
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Eyewitnesses filed numerous police First Information Reports
(FIRs), the initial reports of a crime recorded by the police, that
named local VHP, BJP, and Bajrang Dal leaders as instigators or
participants in the attacks. Few if any of these leaders have been ar-
rested as the police, reportedly under instructions from the state,
face continuous pressure not to arrest them or to reduce the sever-
ity of the charges filed. In many instances, the police have also re-
fused to include in FIRs the names of perpetrators identified by the
victims. Police have, however, filed false charges against Muslim
youth arbitrarily detained during combing operations in Muslim
neighborhoods that have been largely destroyed. The state gov-
ernment has entrusted a criminal probe into the deadliest of at-
tacks in Ahmedabad, in the Naroda Patia and Gulmarg Society'
neighborhoods, to an officer handpicked by the VHP, the organiza-
tion implicated in organizing and perpetrating these massacres. 33
By February 2003, almost a year since the violence began, not a single
trial related to the events had resulted in a conviction. Lawyers representing
Muslim victims were losing faith that justice could be served in a state
where the BJP was in power. Eyewitnesses, still under continuous threat,
had bartered their security and the security of their loved ones in exchange
for turning "hostile" as witnesses, or simply not showing up when the case
went to trial. Even when witnesses would take the stand, the public prosecu-
tor and the judge, in league with the defendants, ensured that the cases
ended in acquittal. 34 The justice machinery has, in effect, been stacked
against Muslims, a process that began years before the massacres.
The BJP first came to power in Gujarat in 1995. The state has since been
dubbed a Hindutva "laboratory." Through years of intense political, social,
and even educational activity, the BJP has sought to infiltrate the state's law
enforcement, civil, and judicial administration with those sympathetic to
the Hindutva cause. A ten-day spate of violence against Christians in Dangs
district, Gujarat, between December 25, 1998 and January 3, 1999, gave
some indication of the extent of this infiltration. Members of the RSS, the
VHP, the Bajrang Dal, and the Hindu Jagran Manch ("HJM") 35 were re-
sponsible for the attacks. Local police refused to register complaints by
Christian victims.36
Christian leaders, individuals, and institutions nationwide came under at-
tack in India soon after the BJP came to power at the federal level in March
1998. While a majority of the reported incidents that year occurred in Gu-
jarat, attacks were also reported in Maharashtra, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh,
Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Manipur,
33. No ORDERS TO SAVE YOU, supra note 14, at 6.
34. Investigations and interviews by the author, in Gujarat (Jan. 2003).
35. The HJM is an offshoot of the sangh parivar, consisting of people who belong to the Bajrang Dal,
VHP and RSS.
36. ATTACKS AGAINST CHRISTIANS, supra note 14, at 27.
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West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, and New Delhi. Attacks included the killing
of priests and missionaries and the raping of nuns. Christian institutions,
including schools, churches, colleges, and cemeteries, were also destroyed.37
The intensity and frequency of attacks increased in September and October
1999, just before national parliamentary elections. Corresponding closely to
particular electoral contests in which Hindu nationalist groups pursued
major strategic goals, the attacks also continued in the periods following
electoral victory. Years later, these attacks are still ongoing.3 8
In part, Christian institutions and individuals have been targeted for their
role in promoting health, literacy, and economic independence among Dalit
and tribal community members. With upper-caste Hindu economic privi-
lege at stake, keeping Dalits and tribals in a state of economic dependency is
a motivating factor in anti-Christian violence and propaganda. As a result,
the sangh parivar has also accused Christians of converting Dalits and tribals
by coercion or force. Many tribals and Dalits have converted to Christianity
in an effort to escape their impoverished state and abusive treatment under
India's caste system. 39 India's National Commission for Minorities has found
no evidence to back up the charges that Dalits and tribals are being con-
verted by force.40 Animists or spirit worshippers by nature, many tribals do
not practice Hinduism. Much like Dalits, they traditionally fall outside the
Hindu fold and are the prime targets of the VHP's "reconversion" cam-
paigns.4 1
The VHP has begun to find legislative support for its endeavors. On Oc-
tober 31, 2002, the state government of Tamil Nadu passed the controver-
sial Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion Bill, aimed largely at
curbing Dalit conversions to Christianity. Ordered by the All India Anna
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam ruling government of Chief Minister Jayala-
litha Jayaram, the bill found support with the BJP; the party would like to
see similar legislation in all other states.4 2
37. Id. at 3.
38. On January 13, 2003, for example, an American missionary, along with others, was attacked, with
swords, sticks, and iron bars in the southern state of Kerala. Police reportedly arrested RSS activists in
relation to the attack. US Missionary Attacked in India, BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-
asia/2659785.htm. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003, at 239 (Jan. 15, 2003)
[hereinafter WORLD REPORT].
39. Dalits, a population of nearly 160 million people, continue to suffer from extreme social discrimi-
nation, exploitation, segregation, and violence because of their rank at the bottom of India's caste system.
Though not the focus of this Article, violence and discrimination against lower castes and Dalits ("un-
touchables") also helps to maintain exploitative economic arrangements that favor higher castes. See
generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BROKEN PEOPLE: CASTE VIOLENCE AGAINST INDIA'S "UNTOUCH-
ABLES" (1999).
40. Interview with Tahir Mahmood, then-Chairperson, National Commission for Minorities, in New
Delhi (May 3, 1999).
41. ATTACKS AGAINST CHRISTIANS, supra note 14, at 12-13.
42. Anti-Conversion Bill Passed in TN., HINDU, (Nov. 1, 2002), at http://www.hinduonnet.com/
thehindu/2002/1 1/01/stories/2002110107030100.htm; P. Radhakrishnan, Opinion, Conversion Politics 11,
HINDU, (Nov. 7, 2002), at http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/11/07/stories/2002110700301000.htm.
As the sangh parivar continues to thrive on funding from Indians living abroad, the government of India
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Moves to ban religious conversions, the increased recruiting of Dalits and
tribals into the RSS fold, and the "reconversion" of Dalits and tribals to
Hinduism are parts of a broader strategy to recast these traditionally margi-
nalized groups into a Hindu identity and deploy them in anti-Christian and
anti-Muslim violence. They have succeeded in part: Dalit and tribal groups
were also implicated in some of the attacks against Muslims in Gujarat. Po-
litically, the vilification of Christians and Muslims is also a synthesizing fea-
ture of Hindutva that helps to consolidate the Hindu vote bank while
stemming the tide of defecting Dalit and tribal voters to opposition parties.
The vilification is also seeping into mainstream discourse-most powerfully,
through the medium of education.
C. Teaching Hate
The violence in Gujarat, while large in scale and methodical in its organi-
zation, was also barbaric in its execution. Young children, the elderly, and
even the handicapped were not spared. Several eyewitnesses recounted inci-
dents in which pregnant women's bellies were cut open. The fetuses were
pulled out and hacked before mother and child were burned. Muslim
women and girls were brutally gang raped in front of their male relatives
and, once killed, their bodies were burnt and charred beyond recognition. 43
For such inhuman acts of violence to become routine, the demonization of
entire communities must first take place. In India this has been effectively
achieved through the medium of education that is increasingly being en-
trusted by the state to the sangh parivar. The Indian government supports,
through official recognition and financial assistance, a large network of pri-
vate schools run by Hindu nationalist organizations that effectively attempt
to indoctrinate children in religious intolerance. When seen in the context
of ongoing communal violence, the work of these private schools amounts to
not only a denial of a child's fundamental right to education, as described
below, but also an incendiary tactic that ensures the spawning of a future
generation of haters, perhaps even killers, mobilized as patriots and
equipped with extensive military and ideological training.
According to a 1996 assessment by India's National Council for Educa-
tional Research and Training, textbooks used by the Vidya Bharati, the edu-
has launched an offensive to cut off foreign financial support to nongovernmental organizations,
particularly human rights organizations, and those that the government claims are involved in forced
conversions of Hindus to Christianity. The RSS has called on the government to expel all missionaries
from the country and stop the flow of foreign funding to "proselytizing agencies working under the
various humanitarian garbs." Meeting the Threat of Conversion, in R.S.S.: A VISION IN ACTION (H. V.
Seshadri ed., 1988), at http://www.rss.org/books/Vision/ch3.html. The following is among the "Points of
Hindu Agenda" drawn up by the VHP as a call for action to political parties in India: "All foreign
remittances to non-governmental agencies, social, religious or service organizations or individuals will be
stopped, so that the money and material so received is not misutilised for religious conversion and other
divisive conspiracies." For a complete list of points, see VISHWA HINDU PARISHAD, POINTS OF HINDU
AGENDA (1997), at http://www.vhp.org/englishsite/f.Hindu-Agenda/HinduAgendaE.htm.
43. No ORDERS TO SAVE You, supra note 14, at 16-20.
2003 / Hindu Nationalism in India
cational wing of the RSS, were "designed to promote bigotry and religious
fanaticism in the name of inculcating knowledge of culture in the young
generation." 44 Children in these schools are indoctrinated in religious intol-
erance, the inferiority of non-Hindus, and the collective blame of Muslims
and Christians for wrongs against Hindus at various points in Indian history,
as interpreted by Hindu nationalists.45 Western thought and civilization are
perceived and propagated as enemies of Hindu culture. Religions such as
Islam and Christianity are depicted as alien to India, as they are the religions
of foreign invaders-the Mughals and the British.46 Both Islam and Christi-
anity were in fact introduced to India long before Mughal and British rule.
The historical reconstruction of Muslim and Christian atrocities and their
projection onto the present as a threat to the integrity and security of India
are powerful weapons in legitimizing ongoing violence against Christians
and Muslims. Stated differently,
If the motif of infinite, elastic revenge unifies past, present and fu-
ture, then the production of an appropriate historical memory is
crucial for the generation of the new political culture. History
teaching, textbooks and historical scholarship have been special
targets of Sangh attacks. They need to assert their monopoly over
historical truth, for there is a strange symmetry between their his-
torical allegations and their present violence. They assert that
Muslims broke temples, and then they demolish mosques. They
allege forced conversion, and then they command victims to utter
the name of Ram or to convert. Legends of rapes of Hindu women
abound, and Muslim women are then raped freely.47
The influence of the sangh parivar's takeover of India's secular educational
space has been greatly augmented since the BJP reached national power in
1998. Of particular concern is the passing of control over state schools to
sangh parivar organizations in states where the BJP is in power, such as Goa
and Gujarat, and, at the national level, the increasing involvement of mem-
bers of these groups in the redrafting of India's national curriculum. In
2002, the national BJP-led government released a new national curriculum
44. Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, A Spreading Network, FRONTLINE, Nov. 7-20, 1998, at http://www.
flonnet.com/fll523/15230100.htm.
45. See generally Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust, The Saffron Agenda in Education: An Exposi (2001);
Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust and Sabrang.com, Against Communalisation ofEducation: Essays, Press Com-
mentary, Reportage (2001).
46. The caste system is also glorified in sangh parivar-inspired education. In Gujarat, for example, the
Gujarat State Board social studies textbook for the ninth grade characterizes the caste or Varna system-a
significant source of human rights violations in India and elsewhere-as a "precious gift of the Aryans to
the mankind," adding that "the importance of the 'Varna' system as an ideal system of building the social
and economic structure of a society cannot be overlooked." 'Caste is a Precious Gift,' COMMUNALISM COM-
BAT, Oct. 1999, at 10.
47. Tanika Sarkar, Semiotics of Terror: Muslim Children and Women in Hindu Rashtra, ECON. & POL.
WKLY., July 13, 2002, at http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/TanikaSarkarJUL02.html.
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largely drafted by members of the RSS and seen by many as a means of in-
jecting religious instruction into education.48
The RSS also reportedly runs upwards of 300,000 shakhas-local cells or-
ganized on the principle that only a militant and powerful Hindu move-
ment can counter threats from so-called outsiders. Shakhas recruit young
boys and men, fifty to one hundred for each cell, providing them with exten-
sive physical training and indoctrinating them with the Hindutva ideol-
ogy.49 An article in The Hindu, a respected English daily in India, states:
The RSS shakhas started functioning in 1925. Every day, they have
'boudhik' sessions that train members in imagined "histories" of
outrage against Hindus. A documentary on shakhas for infants de-
picts a favourite game that enacts the "reconquest" of Kashmir
through battles. We were proudly told by the headmaster of an
RSS-run school in Delhi that he held forth on the Babri mosque
saga at the assembly everyday: five-year-olds would clench their
fists in fury and swear vengeance under the influence of his oratory.
Night schools and sanskar kendras [cultural centers] take these
messages beyond regular schooltime. The RSS itself is acknowl-
edged to be the classroom for all its affiliates and sub-affiliates:
BJP, VHP, Bajrang Dal and hand-picked cadres, trained in daily
shakhas over years, come to these fronts to teach RSS values and
intentions. Pedagogy is an essential tool for the Sangh Parivar.50
Hate propaganda is also disseminated by Hindutva's foot soldiers through
the powerful medium of the local-language media and the distribution of
hate literature on village and city streets. Anti-Christian and anti-Islamic
propaganda has become commonplace in states such as Gujarat.
A week and a half before the Hindu rally in Ahwa town, Gujarat that pre-
cipitated ten days of violence against Christians in December 1998, pam-
phlets promoting the rally and containing anti-Christian propaganda were
distributed in Ahwa and neighboring villages. The English translation of a
Gujarati pamphlet distributed by Hindu Jagran Manch read in part:
The priests of the Christian religion are scared of the awakening of
patriotic Hindus and have begun insulting holy people and volun-
teers of the "Hindu Jagran Manch" through daily papers. This is
an insult to the whole of Hindu society. It is indeed the sacred
duty (dharmanu kaam) of the Hindu religion to teach the bold
Christian priests a lesson and to put them in their place.
48. WORLD REPORT, supra note 38, at 239.
49. Shakhas have long been operational in Gujarat and since the events of February and March 2002
have experienced increased enrollment. Anil Pathak, RSS Shakhas Poised to Swell in State, TIMES OF INDIA,
May 29, 2002.
50. Tanika Sarkar, Hindu Rashtra or Secular State?, HINDU, Nov. 24, 1998, at http://www.mnet.fr/
aiindex/tsarkar.html.
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The conspiracy of converting gullible tribals by giving money,
goods, black magic and also through threats is unearthed now.
Hence, the "Hindu Jagran Manch" is determined to stop the con-
versions and curb all activities of Christian priests. 51
Leaflets depicting Muslims as terrorists intent on destroying the Hindu
community were also in circulation years before the 2002 attacks. RSS and
HJM fliers circulated in August 1998 proclaimed: "India is a country of
Hindus .... Our religion of Rama and Krishna is pious. To convert [or]
leave it is a sin." Another flier by the VHP in Bardoli, Gujarat, warned,
"Caution Hindus! Beware of inhuman deeds of Muslims .... Muslims are
destroying Hindu Community by slaughter houses, slaughtering cows and
making Hindu girls elope. Crime, drugs, terrorism are Muslim's empire. '52
Leaflets calling for an economic boycott of Muslims surfaced in 2002,
financially crippling Gujarat's Muslim community. One such leaflet distrib-
uted by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad read:
WAKE UP! ARISE! THINK! ENFORCE!
SAVE THE COUNTRY! SAVE THE RELIGION!
Economic boycott is the only solution! The anti-national elements
use the money earned from the Hindus to destroy us! They buy
arms! They molest our sisters and daughters! The way to break the
back-bone of these elements is: An economic non-cooperation
movement. 53
The local language media also played a role in fanning the flames of
communal violence in Gujarat. In April 2002, the People's Union for Civil
Liberties and Shanti Abhiyan, both nongovernmental organizations, issued a
report analyzing the role of the vernacular press, including the Vadodara city
51. ATTACKS AGAINST CHRISTIANS, supra note 14, at 18.
52. Id.
53. The leaflet continued with the following ten-point agenda:
Let us resolve-1. From now on I will not buy anything from a Muslim shopkeeper! 2. 1 will
not sell anything from my shop to such elements! 3. Neither shall I use the hotels of these
anti-nationals, nor their garages! 4. I shall give my vehicles only to Hindu garages! From a
needle to gold, I shall not buy anything made by Muslims, neither shall we sell them things
made by us! 5. Boycott wholeheartedly films in which Muslim hero-heroines act! Throw out
films produced by these anti-nationals! 6. Never work in offices of Muslims! Do not rent
them! 7. Do not let them buy offices in our business premises, nor sell or hire out houses to
them in our housing societies, colonies or communities. 8. 1 shall certainly vote, but only for
him who will protect the Hindu nation. 9. I shall be alert to ensure that our sisters-daughters
do not fall into the "love-trap" of Muslim boys at school-college-workplace. 10. 1 shall not re-
ceive any education or training from a Muslim teacher. Such a strict economic boycott will
throttle these elements! It will break their backbone! Then it will be difficult for them to live
in any corner of this country.
Anosh Malekar, Silence of the Lambs, WEEK, Apr. 7, 2002. See also Concerned Citizens Tribunal--Gujarat
2002, Annexure 11: Hate Writing, in I CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY (2002), at http://www.sabrang.com/
tribunal/voll/annex/annex1 1. html.
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edition of Sandesh, a Gujarati-language newspaper. The report concluded
that articles carried by Sandesh fed on "the prevalent anti-Muslim prejudices
of its Hindu readership and provoke[d] it further by sensationalizing,
twisting, mangling and distorting news or what passes for it."54 On Febru-
ary 28, 2002, for example, a day after the attack on Hindus in Godhra, a
Sandesh front-page report read: "AVENGE BLOOD WITH BLOOD. ' 55
D. Patriot or "Anti-Hindu": Creating a False Dichotomy
The dissemination and consumption of hate literature and slanted
inflammatory news articles are indicative of the increasing popularity of a
sentiment systematically honed by the sangh parivar over the last several
decades: that India is a country for Hindus. Perhaps the greatest achieve-
ment of the Hindu right has been to recast the Indian identity as one exclu-
sively reserved for its Hindu citizens. Muslims, Christians, and others are
tolerated minorities whose best interests lie in toeing the majority line. 56
These are the religions of foreign invaders whose current followers must pay
for the alleged and often constructed sins of their forefathers and whose alle-
giance, it is claimed, rests with governments in foreign lands. 57
The Gandhian ethic of nonviolence, the cornerstone of the Indian inde-
pendence struggle, has lost its legitimacy. In its place is an increasingly
class-cutting movement where even large-scale massacre is justified as a pa-
triotic act. Then-Vishwa Hindu Parishad Secretary B. L. Sharma character-
ized the gang rape of four nuns in the state of Madhya Pradesh in September
1998 as the "anger of patriotic Hindu youth against the anti-national forces."
The nuns were accused of trying to convert local Hindus to Christianity.58
On March 1, 2002, at the height of the violence in the state, Gujarat Chief
Minister Narendra Modi, an RSS propagandist, declared that he would con-
trol the "riots resulting from the natural and justified anger of the people." 59
54. PEOPLE'S UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES VADODARA-BARODA AND SHANTI ABHIYAN, THE ROLE
OF NEWSPAPERS DURING THE GUJARAT CARNAGE: A BRIEF ANALYSIS FOR THE PERIOD FEBRUARY 28
TO MARCH 24, 2002 (2002), at http://www.pucl.org/Topics/Religion-communalism/2002/gujarat-media.
htm.
55. Id.
56. On March 17, 2002, for example, the RSS passed a resolution titled "Godhra and After," warning
Muslims that their safety lay in the goodwill of the majority. Hindu Goodwill Key to Muslims' Safety-RSS,
HINDUSTAN TIMES, Mar. 18, 2002.
57. Ghettoized Muslim neighborhoods in Ahmedabad separated by a wall are colloquially referred to
as Pakistan. It is argued that their allegiance, and that of Muslims as a whole in India, is to Pakistan, a
country to which they chose not to migrate during the partition of India and the creation of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan in 1947. Interview with residents of Ahmedabad, in Ahmedabad, Gujarat (Mar. 21,
2002). The phrase "Pakistan ya kabristan" (Pakistan or the graveyard), a popular Hindu nationalist slogan
of the 1980s and 1990s, was zealously revived during the 2002 massacres in Gujarat. Pankaj Mishra,
Murder in India, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Aug. 15, 2002 (reviewing No ORDERS TO SAVE YOU, supra note
14.); Interviews with witnesses and activists, in Ahmedabad, Gujarat (Mar. 21, 2002).
58. Hindu Militants Justify Attacks on Nuns, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 29, 1998.
59. Gujarat Used as Hindutva Laboratory, ASIAN AGE, Mar. 25, 2002, cited in No ORDERS To SAVE
YOU, supra note 14.
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Referring to Newton's laws of physics while discussing the Godhra massa-
cre, Modi told reporters: "Every action has an equal and opposite reaction."
Further, Modi remarked, "the ... people of Gujarat have shown remarkable
restraint under grave provocation.' 60
As in the United States, where since September 11 political dissenters
have been labeled as unpatriotic, in India, patriotism has also been seam-
lessly co-opted by the right. Activists, journalists, and citizens of any faith
who publicly criticize the divisive policies of the sangh parivar or expose
atrocities against religious minorities and Dalits are deemed anti-Hindu
and, hence, anti-national. 6 1 The critique is insidiously recast as an assault on
Hinduism, which in turn is an assault on the nation. Lost in the debate is
the notion that religion itself has been co-opted by political forces claiming
to represent its ideals and its followers.
To demand equal protection of the law for all or to protest when the gov-
ernment kills its own citizens is deemed a threat to the integrity of the na-
tion and an attempt to defile India in the eyes of the international commu-
nity. Conversely, outright murder or rape in the name of avenging past and
present attacks on Hindus (whether fact or fiction), or constructing a Hindu
temple where a Muslim mosque once stood, are all patriotic acts in the
service of one's country.
In the governmental arena, patriotism cloaks itself in the garb of national
security. In an age in which even extrajudicial state action is condoned in the
name of fighting terror and in which terrorism has become the involuntary
monopoly of the non-state (and often Islamic) actor, political opponents and
religious minorities become easy targets. The Indian government continues
to exploit rhetoric surrounding the global "war against terrorism" in order
to target religious minorities and political opponents. Most notably, the
long debated anti-terrorism legislation, the Prevention of Terrorism Act
("POTA"), was pushed through parliament in March 2002.62 Its close re-
semblance to the much misused and now lapsed Terrorists and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act of 1985 (amended 1987) foreshadowed a return
to the widespread and systematic curtailment of civil liberties. 63
60. Scott Baldauf, Indian Government Struggles to Maintain Order: Continuing Riots Test Hindu-led Coali-
tion's Credibility, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 4, 2002.
61. Movements to promote Dalit rights or raise a voice against attacks on religious minorities are also
de-legitimized as foreign-funded or part of a Western conspiracy, once again effectively uniting the In-
dian polity against a constructed outside force. Ultimately, it suggests that those raising a voice on behalf
of the marginalized or calling on the government to enforce its own laws can only be doing so as a means
of garnering funds for their work or under the influence of a foreign anti-national agenda.
62. Deborah Kuan, India: Tough Act, 49 WORLD PRESS REVIEW 6, June 2002, at http://www.
worldpress.org/Asia/555 .cfm.
63. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OPPORTUNISM IN THE FACE OF TRAGEDY: REIPRESSION IN THE NAME
OF ANTI-TERRORISM (Nov. 14, 2002), at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/septemberll/opportunismwatch.
htm#India. These and other forms of national security legislation have a long history of abuse in India, as
well as in Pakistan and Bangladesh, where such laws have been used to subject minorities and political
opponents to arbitrary arrest, preventive detention, torture, and death in custody. Increasingly, these laws
are being recast and redeployed in the name of fighting "terror."
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The POTA creates an overly broad definition of terrorism, while expand-
ing the state's investigative and procedural powers. Moreover, under the
POTA, suspects can be detained for up to three months without charge, and
up to three months more with permission by a special judge.64 As of January
2003, the government had already selectively used the POTA against politi-
cal dissenters in Kashmir and Tamil Nadu, 65 yet not against members of the
sangh parivar, including those in Gujarat.
Muslims arrested following the killing of Hindus in Godhra, Gujarat
were quickly charged under the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance that pre-
ceded the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Those arrested for the ensuing at-
tacks against Muslims did not face the same charges. Many have been re-
leased on bail, while others, including BJP, VHP, and RSS officials identified
by eyewitnesses as ringleaders of the attacks, have escaped arrest alto-
gether. 66 After much protest, the POTA charges against the Godhra arrestees
were eventually dropped. But the message from the state was clear: attacks
against Hindus are the actions of terrorists and a threat to the integrity of
the state. Conversely, economic boycotts, widespread violence, and gang rape
of Muslims in the name of avenging Hindu deaths are deemed the spontane-
ous and even justified acts of patriotic Indians reacting to a terrorist threat.67
II: HINDU NATIONALISM AND ITS BROADER CONSEQUENCES
The increasing dominance of Hindu nationalism as a political and social
force in India has consequences beyond its impact on the lives of India's re-
ligious minorities. In addition to subverting the rule of law within the
country, it helps fuel a cycle of retaliatory communal violence across borders.
When combined with rising religious fundamentalism in Bangladesh and
Pakistan, it also threatens regional security. The second Part of this Article
explores these broader consequences of an unchecked Hindu nationalist
agenda.
64. Neelesh Misra, India Moves To Curtail Terrorism, CBS NEwS, Mar. 26, 2002, at http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2002/03/26/attack/main504660.shtml.
65. WORLD REPORT, supra note 38, at 241. The newly elected government of the state of Jammu and
Kashmir announced in October 2002 an action plan to curb human rights abuses by Indian security
forces, adding that the POTA would no longer be used in the state. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INDIA:
JAMMU/KASHMIR GOVERNMENT SHOULD IMPLEMENT HUMAN RIGHTS (Nov. 25, 2002), at http://web.
amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/ASA200222002 ?OpenDocument&of=Countries\indiaProgram.
66. No ORDERS TO SAVE You, supra note 14, at 18.
67. Terrorism again took center stage during the December 2002 state assembly elections in Gujarat.
Chief Minister Narendra Modi equated opposition to the BJP with support to Mian Musharraf' of Paki-
stan (Mian is a derogatory term for Muslim), adding that a victory for the BJP would mark an end to
Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. Modi effectively cast the opposition Congress (1) Party, which was heavily
favored by Muslim voters, as anti-national and pro-terrorist. Neena Vyas, We Shall Replicate 'Gujarat
Experience': BJP Chief, HINDU, Dec. 24, 2002, at http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/12/24/stories/
2002122404900100.htm.
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A. Nullification of Indian and International Law
The complicity and direct participation of state officials in episodes of
communal carnage in India and the ongoing impunity for campaigns of or-
chestrated violence undermine legal protections afforded to religious minori-
ties under international and Indian law. International human rights law,
India's constitutional provisions, and domestic legislation together impose
on the government of India a duty to guarantee certain basic rights to mi-
nority populations, to prosecute those who participate in communal vio-
lence, and to punish state officials who, having the power and duty to stop
the violence, do not intervene.
The preamble of the Indian constitution openly declares India as a "sover-
eign socialist secular democratic republic" which ensures to all citizens "lib-
erty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship." In the Indian context,
secularism implies equality of rights for all regardless of religion, the exer-
cise of religious freedom and tolerance, and the rejection of discrimination
based on religion or belief.
Under Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Indian constitution, discrimination
on the grounds of religion is prohibited, and all citizens are guaranteed the
right to equal treatment before the law and the right to equal protection of
the laws. Article 25 guarantees the right to practice freely and propagate
religion while Articles 26, 28, and 30 ensure the freedom of citizens to
manage religious affairs, to attend religious instruction or religious worship
in certain educational institutions and the rights of minorities to establish
and administer educational institutions. Article 28 also prohibits religious
instruction in any educational institution wholly maintained out of state
funds.68
India is also party to several international treaties that impose human
rights obligations. Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights establishes the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion. 69 Articles 2 and 26 bar discrimination on the grounds of religion
while Article 27 dictates that "[iun those States in which ethnic, religious or
linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be
denied the right, in community with the other members of the their group,
68. Select provisions of the Indian Penal Code make punishable acts of violence or discrimination
based on religion. The Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988, prevents the misuse of
religious places for political and criminal activities. The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act,
1991, prohibits the conversion of any place of worship of any religious denomination into a place of
worship of a different religious institution and for the maintenance of the religious character of places of
worship as it existed on August 15, 1947. And the Representation of the People Act, 1951, prohibits the
use of religion or religious symbols to promote one's candidacy or to affect adversely the election of an-
other candidate as a corrupt practice that debases the election and is a punishable offense. INDIA CONST.,
available at http://alfa.nic.in/const/const.html.
69. India acceded to the convention on April 10, 1979. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF THE RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2002),
at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report/pdf.
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to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to
use their own language."70
The principle of non-discrimination is also a cornerstone of the right to
education as framed by international law. Where state-sponsored public
education or state-sanctioned private education promotes hatred and bigotry
towards a particular group, students from that group suffer discrimination
in violation of international law. The prohibition of discrimination applies
specifically to the right to education. The Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights has stated: "The prohibition against discrimination
enshrined in article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights is subject to neither progressive realization nor the
availability of resources; it applies fully and immediately to all aspects of
education and encompasses internationally prohibited grounds of discrimi-
nation."71
Where non-Hindu children are limited to schools which use the Vidya
Bharati curriculum, they are restricted to education of an inferior standard
in that the instruction they receive discriminates against them by stigma-
tizing them as inferior citizens, and failing to take into account their culture
or religion. For the majority of Hindu children, an education in hate, framed
by falsified teachings of history, is not an education. They too are deprived of
an education free from intolerance and bigotry.
The Indian government has largely failed in delivering these protections
and fulfilling its obligations. The RSS and its affiliates are allowed to operate
openly, with impunity, and, increasingly, with state funding and support.
The constitutional principle of a secular democracy is continually subverted
as the rule of law takes a dangerous second to the promotion of a Hindu
state. Ultimately, as the state actively participates in undermining its own
laws, the evisceration of domestic and international standards and the ensu-
ing corruption among law enforcement officials weakens access to justice for
citizens of all faiths. 7
2
70. The right to freedom of religion and prohibitions on discrimination on the grounds of religion are
further elaborated upon in the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Dis-
crimination Based on Religion or Belief. Although not a treaty, this declaration, proclaimed by the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations in 1981, provides authoritative guidelines to UN member states on
ways to eliminate religious intolerance and discrimination. Article 4 of the declaration proclaims that,
"All States shall take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds of relig-
ion or belief in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all
fields of civil, economic, political, social and cultural life," and that "[aill States shall make all efforts to
enact or rescind legislation where necessary to prohibit any such discrimination, and to take all appropri-
ate measures to combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or other beliefs in this matter." OFFICE OF
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS (2002), at http:// www. unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/acppr.htm.
71. India acceded to the convention on April 10, 1979. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 69.
72. Portions of the above analysis of Indian constitutionalism draw heavily on the analysis of interna-
tional and Indian law by the author in ATTACKS AGAINST CHRISTIANS, supra note 14.
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B. Communal Retaliation Across Borders
Just as thousands of Muslim community members in Gujarat were pun-
ished for the actions of a few, violence against Muslims in India has its corre-
sponding effect on Hindus in Bangladesh and Pakistan. These attacks are
based on the perverse logic that holds an entire community responsible for
the actions of a few. Whether it plays itself out on the pages of a history
textbook or as a justification for day-to-day assaults, the conclusion drawn is
the same: the sum is guilty of all the misdeeds of its parts, even across con-
tinents and borders. 73
In Bangladesh, Hindus were attacked following the demolition of the
Babri mosque in India in December 1992.74 The Hindu minority in Paki-
stan, already marginalized, has been further targeted as a result of height-
ened tensions in Kashmir. According to Minority Rights Group Interna-
tional, in 2002, violence against Muslims in Gujarat "served to further
stigmatise the Hindu minority in Pakistan and led to increased communal
tensions. ,75
The logic comes full circle when members of the sangh parivar present
the ongoing persecution of Hindus in Bangladesh and Pakistan's support of
Islamic militancy in Kashmir as arguments in support for and in defense of
the persecution of Muslims in India.76 Following the attack on Hindu ac-
tivists in Godhra, VHP International General Secretary Praveen Togadia
fanned Hindu insecurity and vengefulness by claiming that the events of
Godhra would be repeated all over India if the actions of terrorists from
across the border (in Pakistan) were not immediately contained.77 For his
part, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee invoked the threat of Is-
73. Hate crimes against Muslims, Arabs, and those of South Asian or Middle Eastern descent in the
United States also rose dramatically in the months following the September 11 attack on the World
Trade Center. Anti-Muslim hate crimes in the United States rose 1700% during 2001. See HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, "WE ARE NOT THE ENEMY": HATE CRIMES AGAINST ARABS, MUSLIMS, AND THOSE
PERCEIVED TO BE ARAB OR MUSLIM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 at 4 (2002).
74. The subject of the acclaimed Bangladeshi author Taslima Nasrin's book Lajja (Shame) is the vio-
lence against Hindus in Bangladesh in 1992, following the destruction of the Babri Masjid in India on
December 6 of that year. It is told through the eyes of a fictionalized Hindu family. Lajja was published
in February 1993 and banned by the Bangladeshi government five months later for disturbing the com-
munal peace. In September 1993 afatwa was issued against Nasrin by a fundamentalist organization and
a reward was offered for her death. TASLIMA NASRIN, LAJJA ix (Tutul Gupta trans., Penguin Books 1994)
(1993).
75. MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INT'L, PAKISTAN URGED TO ACT TO DEFEND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES
(Oct. 9, 2002), at http://www.minorityrights.org. On May 12, the government of Bangladesh issued a
note verbale to the Indian high commissioner claiming that "several hundred Bengali-speaking families
from India [were) trying to flee the communal violence in Gujarat and [were] attempting to illegally
cross into Bangladesh." The note added that despite ongoing communal violence in Gujarat, "the situa-
tion in Bangladesh [had) been calm." Reports in the Bangladeshi press stated that the refugees had in
fact left Bangladesh for Gujarat about a decade ago and were now returning for fear of their safety. V.
Sudarshan, Wretched of the Earth, OUTLOOK, June 17, 2002, at http://www.hvk.org/articles/0602/148.
html.
76. Dilemma over Hindus in Bangladesh, TIMES OF INDIA, May 7, 2002.
77. Godhra Incident Could be Repeated Elsewhere Togadia, TIMES OF INDIA, Sept. 9, 2002.
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lamic terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and stated:
"Where there are Muslims, they do not want to live in peace with others.
Instead of living peacefully, they want to propagate their religion by creat-
ing terror in the minds of others."7 8
Regardless of the rhetoric deployed, the actions of one country can and do
affect the lives of minorities in another-more so in the case of the Indian
subcontinent where the drawing of borders along religious lines7 9 foreshad-
owed decades of ill-treatment of migrants and of religious minorities left
behind. Muslims who migrated to Pakistan during the partition, collec-
tively referred to as Mohajjirs, continue to suffer discrimination. Hindus
who left Pakistan for India also faced years of hardship and discrimination
though they arguably have fared better in their long-term assimilation.
More perilous in contemporary South Asia has been the lot of Muslims in
India who did not migrate to Pakistan (see above), of Hindus in Bangladesh
and the disputed territory of Kashmir,80 and of religious minorities in the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Recent abuses against Hindus in Pakistan and
Bangladesh have only exacerbated their already tenuous legal and political
standing. The following Section briefly explores the vulnerability of relig-
ious minorities in both countries.
C. Religious Minorities in Pakistan and Bangladesh
Pakistan's parliamentary elections in October 2002, the first of their kind
since the military coup that brought then-General, now President, Pervez
Musharraf to power in October 1999, ushered in the dramatic and unprece-
dented rise of religious parties. The Mutahidda Majlis-a-Amal, a coalition of
six Islamic parties opposed to U.S. presence in the region and Pakistan's par-
ticipation in the war on terror, won 60 of the 342 seats in the national as-
78. Editorial, Gandhi's Horror, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2002. Both Vajpayee and Deputy Prime Minister
L.K. Advani are longtime RSS members.
79. The partition of India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947 have undoubtedly left deep scars in the
minds of the millions who were uprooted during the world's largest forced mass migration. Hundreds of
thousands were killed in inter-religious violence. Almost a quarter of a century later, on March 26, 1971,
East Pakistan attained independence and became the sovereign state of Bangladesh. It took nine more
months for Pakistani troops to leave the state. BBC NEWS, Timeline: Bangladesh, Aug. 7, 2002, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/l/low/world/southasia/1160896.stm. An estimated three million people were killed and
300,000 women raped by the Pakistani army and local collaborators during the nine-month liberation
war. Musharraf Regrets 'Excesses' by Pak Troops in 1971, INDIA ABROAD, July 30, 2002, at http://www.
rediff.com/news/2002/ju1/29bang 1.htm.
80. The tug-of-war over Kashmir, twice the cause of full-fledged wars between India and Pakistan,
continues to bring the two countries to the brink of war. The last war ended with a cease-fire resulting in
a 1972 partition along what is called the line of control. Pakistan controls about a third of Kashmir's
86,000 square miles; India holds most of the rest. Although this Article does not focus on the situation
of religious minorities in Kashmir, abuses against the Hindu minority in the state at the hands of mili-
tant insurgents have been tremendous. Beginning in 1988 Hindus in the Kashmir valley were made the
targets of threats and acts of violence by militant organizations. A wave of killings that left thousands
dead led to the large-scale displacement of Kashmir's Hindu population, many of whom continue to live
as internally displaced persons elsewhere in the country and the state.
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sembly, reflecting a strong undercurrent of resentment over the U.S. war in
Afghanistan.8'
The Pakistani government's continuing support of U.S. efforts against al-
Qaeda also led to targeted violence against foreign nationals and religious
minorities, Christians in particular. Using grenades and gunfire, attacks
were directed at Christian churches, schools, and humanitarian organiza-
tions, and resulted in many deaths. The government moved slowly to arrest
those responsible. In many cases, attackers have escaped prosecution alto-
gether. 82
Blasphemy laws continue to be employed in Pakistan to persecute relig-
ious minorities. The laws, introduced by General Zia-ul Haq in 1985, make
it punishable by death to make derogatory comments about the Prophet
Mohammed or other holy Islamic figures. Arrests under the law can be made
upon complaint, even without an investigation, leading to numerous false
charges, used by complainants to settle scores with those accused.
In April 1998, Ayub Masih, a Christian man, was sentenced to death for
allegedly speaking favorably of Salman Rushdie.5 3 In August 2002, the Su-
preme Court of Pakistan overturned Masih's conviction, noting that the
complainant had been involved in a land dispute with Masih and that
shortly after his 1996 arrest, the complainant had moved onto Masih's land
and secured a transfer of title to his name.84 On July 27, 2002, a judge sen-
tenced twenty-six-year-old Wajihul Hassan to death for allegedly making
phone calls and writing letters to the complainant that contained derogatory
remarks about the Prophet Mohammed. 85
Until January 2002, religious minorities in Pakistan were also deprived of
many of their political rights. On January 16, 2002, President Musharraf
abolished a sixteen-year-old system of separate electorates for Pakistan's re-
ligious minorities. Minorities have long claimed that a separate electorate,
introduced by General Zia-ul Haq in 1985, effectively marginalized them
from mainstream politics, and welcomed the decision to restore joint elec-
tions. Under the separate electorate system, religious minorities were re-
81. Pro Taliban Faction Wins in Pakistan Elections, United Press Int'l, October 11, 2002, at http://www.
newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/10/11/74602.shtml.
82. DR. IFTIKHAR H. MALIK, MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INT'L, REPORT: RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN
PAKISTAN (2002), at http://www.minorityrights.org/admin/Download/pdf/MRGPakistanReport.pdf. For
information on the treatment of Ahmadis (members of a Muslim sect who are by law classified as a non-
Muslim minority) and sectarian violence between majority Sunni Muslims and minority Shiite Muslims,
see SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, THE RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE IN PAKI-
STAN (Feb. 12, 2001), at http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF31.htm.
83. SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, supra note 82.
84. WORLD REPORT, supra note 38, at 264.
85. Id. In 2000, Musharraf's proposal to restrict application of the Blasphemy laws was abruptly
withdrawn following widespread protests by religious groups. According to the U.S. State Department's
2002 Report on International Religious Freedom, "When blasphemy and other religious cases are
brought to court, extremists often pack the courtroom and make public threats against an acquittal."
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2002: PAKISTAN (Oct. 7, 2002), at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/14026.htm.
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stricted to voting for candidates contesting limited seats reserved for their
religious group, and from running as candidates in Muslim electorates. 86
Bangladesh, a nation that at its birth defiantly rejected Islam as the basis
of statehood, is starting to lose its secular credentials. In October 2001, gen-
eral elections brought the Bangladesh National Party to power in coalition
with an alliance of Islamic parties including the Jamaat-e-Islami party. Ja-
maat-e-Islami staunchly fought against the liberation of Bangladesh from
Pakistan87 and now advocates for the strict implementation of Islamic
Shari'a law in Bangladesh, as it was applied in Afghanistan by the Taliban.88
The ruling Bangladesh National Party is led by Khaleda Zia, widow of
Pakistan's General Zia-ul-Haq who, in addition to legalizing discrimination
against religious minorities in Pakistan, amended the original constitution
of East Pakistan replacing secularism with the "Sovereignty of Allah." 89 In
1988, the constitution of Bangladesh was modified to make Islam the state
religion (Article 2A).90 A report in the Far Eastern Economic Review claimed
that in the last decade madrassas, religious schools, have mushroomed in
Bangladesh, adding that an estimated 64,000 such schools now are operat-
ing throughout the country.91
Following the October 2001 elections, violence became a defining hall-
mark of the Hindu experience, much of it reportedly at the behest of the
government. 92 An Amnesty International report released in December 2001
documented the involvement of cadres from both the Jamaat-e-Islami party
and the BNP in crimes against Hindus. 93 Christians, Buddhists, and dis-
senting Muslims were targeted as well, many for their perceived support of
the opposition Awami League. 94 Hindu homes were looted, vandalized, and
86. Australian Catholic Social Justice Council, Social Justice Body Welcomes End Of Separate Electorates In
Pakistan, Jan. 21, 2002, at http://www.socialjustice.catholic.org.au/content/mediareleases/2002 01 21
1021862697.html.
87. See Musharraf Regrets 'Excesses' hy Pak Troops in 1971, supra note 79.
88. Ruth Baldwin, The "Talihanization" of Bangladesh, THE NATION, May 18, 2002, at http://www.
thenation.com/doc.mhtml?I=20020527&s=baldwin20020527.
89. Id.
90. BBC NEWS, supra note 79.
91. Bertil Liotner, Bangladesh: A Cocoon of Terror, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 4, 2002, at http://www.
asiapacificms.com/articles/bangladeshterror/.
92. AMNESTY INT'L, BANGLADESH: ATTACKS ON MEMBERS OF THE HINDU MINORITY 1-2 (Jan. 12,
2001).
93. Id
94. As in India, dissenters, journalists, and activists in Bangladesh have also suffered a backlash for
being outspoken on what they see as an erosion of the ideals of tolerance and democracy and, in the case
of Bangladesh, the growing political power of the military and of Islamic groups. Those attempting to
expose atrocities against Hindus, including journalists, have themselves faced harassment and in some
cases arrest. One example is that of filmmaker Shahriar Kabir. In November 2001, upon returning to
Dhaka after filming Hindu refugees from Bangladesh for his documentary Cry for Amity, Kabir was ar-
rested on charges of treason and detained under the Special Powers Act of 1974. After spending fifty-nine
days in the Dhaka Central Jail, Kabir was granted six months' interim bail, though his life was continu-
ally threatened by religious extremists in the country. A member of parliament, also a leader of the Ja-
maat-e-Islami party, issued a fatwa against Kabir, and declared him a murtad-a person eligible to be
killed. Baldwin, supra note 88.
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burned and Hindu temples and sacred sites were destroyed. Scores of Hindu
women and girls were raped, confirming once again that as in India and
other parts of the world, rape is a potent weapon in religious and ethnic
conflict. In some cases, they were gang raped in front of their male relatives.
The attackers then asked the victims to leave their homes. Hindus have also
been assaulted on the streets, in their homes, and at their workplace. Sys-
tematic attacks have resulted in a mass migration of Hindus to bordering
Indian states. Abuses against Hindus are not a new phenomenon, however.
They have endured discrimination, violence, and harassment by the gov-
ernments of East Pakistan and Bangladesh, including under the recently
defeated Awami League government. 95
In 1965, following the Indo-Pak war, the government of East Pakistan
passed the Enemy Property (Custody and Registration) Order II, legalizing
economic discrimination against Hindus. The order was used to take away
land from Hindus who were identified as enemies of the state and character-
ized as supporters of India.96 Following the independence of Bangladesh, the
president passed Order No. 29 of 1972 and changed the name of the 1965
Order to the Vested Property Act ("VPA") under which the government
vested itself with so-called enemy properties. Nothing contained in the or-
der could be called into question by any court and to date there has been no
judicial review of the Act. Bangladeshi NGOs contend that implementation
of these laws has accelerated a process of mass exodus of Hindus from Bang-
ladesh since the 1960s. A loss of land leads to a loss of livelihood, pushing
affected Hindus into poverty. According to census estimates, upwards of 5.3
million Hindus may have left Bangladesh between 1964 and 1991. 97
95. See Bangladeshi Hindus Cross into India's West Bengal, PRESS TRUST OF INDIA, Nov. 7, 2001; see also
SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, ATTACKS ON HINDU MINORITIES IN BANG-
LADESH: THE INSURGENCY FALLOUT IN NORTH EAST INDIA Dec. 12, 2001, at http://www.hrdc.net/
sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF48.htm.
96. SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, THE HINDU MINORITY IN BANGLA-
DESH: LEGALLY IDENTIFIED ENEMIES (Jan. 11, 2000), at http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF13.
htm.
97. Id. On April 9, 2001, the Parliament of Bangladesh passed the Vested Properties Return Act
2001 to restore vested properties to their original owners. Critics of the law charge that a plethora of
restrictions and exceptions to the bill render it meaningless for most of those affected by the VPA. For
more see SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, BANGLADESH: THE VESTED PROP-
ERTIES RETURN ACT, 2001 (Apr. 18, 2001), at http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF35.htm.
Likewise, Hindus in Pakistan have been pushed into desperate poverty through exploitative economic
relationships that ensure their continued bondage. In Pakistan, bonded labor is most prevalent in the
agricultural provinces of southern Punjab and Sindh where most laborers are minority Hindus from lower
castes. Dexter Filkins, Serfs Cast offChains in Pakistan, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1999, at Al. Though illegal,
the practice of keeping laborers in bondage remains largely unprosecuted. In a pattern similar to that
practiced in India, Nepal, and other parts of the subcontinent, the charging of exorbitantly high interest
rates ensures that loans from landowners are never repaid. While the loan agreement is often made be-
tween the landowner and the male head of the peasant household, the work to pay off the loan is per-
formed by the entire family, including women and children. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CONTEMPORARY
FORMS OF SLAVERY IN PAKISTAN 12-13 (1995). Women have also been held in custody by landowners
when bonded male members of the family leave the land or area, and have even been sold into marriage
or prostitution when the male family member has failed to return. Id. at 66. As with bonded labor cases
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D. Undermining Security in South Asia
The flow of refugees across borders and the increasing influence of the re-
ligious right in the governance of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh pose seri-
ous threats to the security of the region as a whole. This has been most viv-
idly illustrated in the case of Kashmir, where ongoing abuses and human
rights violations by Islamic militants and Indian security forces continue to
escalate the potential for nuclear conflict.
The jingoistic policies of both Pakistan and India vis-a-vis Kashmir have
turned the lives of ordinary Kashmiris into living nightmares. Attacks by
Pakistan-supported militants and Indian security forces, the placement of
landmines along the Indo-Pak border on both sides, election-related vio-
lence, and periodic exchanges of fire across the Line of Control have led to
thousands of civilian casualties in the last few years alone. In May 1998,
Pakistan and India tested nuclear weapons in succession, putting the world
on notice that any future war between the two states may be a nuclear one.
While the possible threat of nuclear war is serious and deserving of atten-
tion, aggressive posturing over Kashmir also helps to draw attention away
from grave abuses by both states against their own citizens.
Abuses by the military regime and the religious right in Pakistan have
largely been overlooked in a tacit exchange for Pakistan's support for the
U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. India has moved quickly to point out the irony
of rewarding Pakistan, monetarily and diplomatically, for its role in fighting
terror as it continues to sponsor violence in Kashmir. In India, international
scrutiny over the massacre of Muslims was quickly sidelined when India
threatened another standoff with Pakistan within months of the Gujarat
violence.
Jingoism over Kashmir also satisfies the domestic political agendas of
both governments as the BJP hopes to overcome key losses in state elections
in 2002 and secure victory during national elections in 2004. In Pakistan,
where military regimes have long needed the backing and support of the
religious right, there can be no backing down on Pakistan's claim to the
majority Muslim state.
Government-sponsored persecution of minorities in Bangladesh also has a
corresponding effect on security in northeast India. According to the South
Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, a prominent human rights
NGO based in Delhi, the insurgency movements in the Indian state of
Tripura "are directly related to the uncontrolled illegal migration [of Bang-
ladeshi Hindus] into Tripura, the marginalisation of the indigenous Tripuris
and unwillingness of New Delhi and Agartala to take cognisance of the
in India, Nepal, and Bangladesh, children often inherit their families' debts and remain trapped in a
cycle of debt bondage.
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problem." The insurgency led by the United Liberation Front of Assam, the
NGO adds, is also rooted in anti-foreigner agitation in Assam state.98
The failure to prosecute those responsible for campaigns of orchestrated
attacks against religious minorities in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh
serves only to embolden the attackers and sends the signal that while the
killer of one may be punished, the killer of hundreds, even thousands, in the
name of fighting so-called enemies of the state can continue to do so with
impunity. Impunity also sows the seeds of further violence against those
seeking justice.
On September 24, 2002, for example, two gunmen stormed the Akshard-
ham Hindu temple of the Swaminarayan sect in Gandhinagar, Gujarat,
killing thirty-two people and injuring fifty-three. According to officers in-
vestigating the attacks, notes found in the gunmen's pockets identified the
attackers as members of a "movement for revenge," presumably for the vio-
lence against Muslims in Gujarat in February and March 2002. 99 Investiga-
tions into the attack were ongoing at this writing.
With virtually no access to justice and little in the way of economic reha-
bilitation, the victims of the Gujarat pogrom could conceivably turn to ter-
ror tactics as acts of desperation. Standing in front of a mass gravesite where
several members of his family were buried in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, one vic-
tim commented, "They keep talking about terrorism in Sri Lanka and Paki-
stan. But isn't what [the sangh parivar] did worse than terrorism? Now this
is what gives birth to terrorists, now terrorists will be born." 100 Ironically,
invoking the threat of Islamic terrorism to justify attacks against Muslims
may well give rise to a form of Islamic militancy in India that has so far been
limited to the conflict in Kashmir. The government's response to terrorism,
in India and the world over, will also continue to ensnare many innocent
civilians or dissenting citizens in its wake.
CONCLUSION
The ideal of a secular democracy, enshrined in the Indian constitution as
equal respect for all religions, is not a self-fulfilling prophecy. Violence
against Christians in 1998, against Muslims in Bombay in 1992 and 1993
98. SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, supra note 95. The article adds: "there
is no denying that most Hindus migrate to India permanently due to the insecurity and repression they
face in Bangladesh. New Delhi's silence and tacit approval of Hindu fundamentalist organisations in
India have encouraged Hindus to migrate to India, and have forestalled the seeking of a permanent reso-
lution of the status of millions of Hindus in Bangladesh." Id.
99. Investigations by the author, in Gandhinagar, Gujarat (Jan. 2003).
100. Interview by the author, in Ahmedabad, Gujarat (Mar. 21, 2002). Terrorist attacks mounted by
young Sikh separatists in north India through the late eighties and early nineties were partly a result of
the 1984 anti-Sikh violence in Delhi that claimed 2000 lives. See supra note 1. In response, the Indian
government sought to crush the separatist movement through a campaign of torture, arbitrary arrest, and
the forced disappearances of thousands of Sikhs in Punjab whose families are still seeking answers to their
whereabouts. See generally Jaskaran Kaur, A Judicial Blackout: Judicial Impunity for Disappearances in Punjab,
India, 15 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 269 (2002).
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or Gujarat in 2002, and in countless places before and in between these
defining communal events, are easily depicted as riots, inevitable clashes
between two disagreeable communities with equal blame and equal loss on
both sides. Less obvious to the outside world, though increasingly well-
documented by India's human rights community, is that these so-called riots
are guided by the goal of creating a Hindu state, and executed in close coop-
eration with state officials.
There is hope to be found in the mobilization of civil society against the
excesses of power, and in the face of the tremendous backlash that silences
dissent in the name of defending national security. The condemnation of
events in February and March 2002 in India was swift, decisive, and came
from all quarters, including civil society, the national media, the National
Human Rights Commission, and the central government. Moreover, Gujarat
is not India: a country that in the more than five decades of its independent
existence has enjoyed a largely peaceful coexistence between members of
multiple faiths.
The secular fabric is, however, beginning to tear, and its impact is being
felt across borders. In a region prone to conflict, where military options are
increasingly exercised in consultation with the religious right, the rise of
Hindu nationalism cannot be ignored.
